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Abstract. We propose a centralised platform for quantitative bench-
marking of key performance indicators (KPI) among mutually distrust-
ful organisations. Our platform offers users the opportunity to request
an ad-hoc benchmarking for a specific KPI within a peer group of their
choice. Architecture and protocol are designed to provide anonymity to
its users and to hide the sensitive KPI values from other clients and the
central server. To this end, we integrate user-centric peer group forma-
tion, exchangeable secure multi-party computation protocols, short-lived
ephemeral key pairs as pseudonyms, and attribute certificates. We show
by empirical evaluation of a prototype that the performance is acceptable
for reasonably sized peer groups.
1 Introduction
During financial crisis banks have an increased need to take their bearings
on the market. The comparison of own key performance indicators (KPI)
to competitors’ ones or to the overall baseline within the industry is a
promising approach. Relevant KPIs may be for instance the proportion of
subprimes in the asset portfolio or the return per worker in segment. Such
benchmarks are traditionally calculated by a trusted third party (TTP)
– which inevitably learns the KPI values in the process.
Benchmarking becomes non-trivial, though, when competitors are mu-
tually distrustful or unwilling to hand over their KPI values to a TTP.
Although the application of secure multi-party computation (SMC) proto-
cols is a frequently cited solution, significant results can only be obtained
if users can ensure comparability of their KPIs. An intuitive solution for
this task is user-controlled peer-group formation, i. e. the initiator of a
benchmarking may specify concrete selection criteria all participants have
to meet (cf. Table 1).
To the best of our knowledge there is currently no practical solution
with acceptable security properties for this challenge. In this paper we
present a platform that allows privacy-preserving comparison of KPIs over
Table 1. Example of selection attributes, attribute values of an individual user i, and
selection criteria used for peer-group formation of benchmarking b.
Selection attribute sj Attribute values a
(i)
j Selection criteria c
(b)
j aj matches cj
Location (country) Germany Germany true
Business area financial services financial services true
Sales in 1000 US$ 517,000 100 < x ≤ 1000 false
the Internet – not relying on a TTP at all. It integrates user-controlled
peer group formation with exchangeable SMC protocols and offers its
users practical anonymity. We discuss the requirements and the attacker
model addressed by the platform, outline the architecture and protocols
employed and evaluate the performance of a prototypical implementation.
2 Related Work
There have been a couple of initiatives to develop Internet-based bench-
marking systems (cf. [1, 2]). However they neglect important privacy is-
sues. Those issues can be tackled with SMC protocols. Numerous variants
have been proposed in the last decades, among them generic ones [3–6] as
well as protocols tailored for specific scenarios [7–9].
The work by Kerschbaum et al. [10–12] is especially focused on privacy-
preserving benchmarking between (mutually distrustful) organisations.
Their concept of peer-group formation using adapted k-means cluster-
ing is fundamentally different from our user-controlled approach, though.
While Kerschbaum’s proposal in [12] only allows users to be part of one
peer group at a given time, we enable participation in various peer groups.
Furthermore, our approach offers more privacy to the users, which may
increase adoptability. Finally, while Kerschbaum et al. advocate an SMC
protocol based on homomorphic encryption for their benchmarking plat-
form, we additionally consider a secret sharing scheme from [3].
Catrina et al. [13] advocate the involvement of a central service provider
that does not take part in benchmarking computations, but only offers
communications services to the clients. Furthermore, they suggest that
clients delegate work to multiple identical service providers to distribute
trust among them and to reduce the risk of compromise.
3 Architecture Overview
Many SMC protocols (e. g. [3]) rely on fully meshed peer-to-peer com-
munications. Catrina et al. [13] argue that this network topology is not
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Fig. 1. Involved parties: users (U), service provider (SP), certification authority (CA)
suitable in a real-world setting, though. They advocate the involvement of
a central service provider (SP) that reduces complexity, acting as a com-
munication mediator for the clients (star topology). We have designed our
platform following this reasoning. However, in contrast to their proposal
to employ multiple identical service providers, we include a certification
authority (CA) in our architecture. We believe that users are more likely to
trust a dedicated CA than multiple (possibly relatively unknown) service
providers (cf. Kerschbaum’s argumentation in the introduction of [11]).
Figure 1 shows the physical and logical architecture of the platform.
Clients do not communicate directly with each other, but only via the
public SP. The SP stores incoming messages temporarily, and the clients
poll the SP to retrieve new messages in regular intervals. For address-
ing a specific recipient, clients use public key certificates as pseudonyms.
Moreover, the SP allows clients to request new benchmarkings or discover
currently running ones as well as to retrieve the results of past ones. The
CA issues certificates used for various purposes.
4 Requirements and Attacker Model
Table 2 contains the set of functional and non-functional requirements
which are addressed by our privacy-preserving benchmarking platform.
Our attacker model is based on the definitions for multilateral security
[14]. We differentiate between the group of all users of the platform (users)
and the (usually smaller) group of participating users (participants) of
an ongoing benchmarking. Following classical SMC research principles
[15], we limit our attacker model to participants who are semi-honest
(“honest but curious”) for now: they follow the protocol and always tell
the truth1. However, they may try to learn other participants’ KPI values
1 For sake of brevity we neglect free-riding and truth-telling issues in this paper. Refer
to Ziv’s model [16] for a detailed treatment of these issues. In future research, we
will look into incentives that encourage truth-telling.
Table 2. The benchmarking platform addresses functional (F) and non-functional, i. e.
security (S) and usability (U), requirements.
# Description
F1 User-driven Initiation. Each user of the platform can initiate a benchmarking
of a particular KPI whenever need arises.
F2 User-controlled Peer Group Formation. An accurate definition of the peer
group is a prerequisite to gain useful insights from the benchmarking. The
initiator must be able to control the peer-group formation process on a
per-benchmarking level so that the participants meet certain criteria. The criteria
should be specified with real-world attributes to facilitate intuitive classification.
F3 Support for Various Statistics. The platform must support the calculation of
various statistics (e. g. mean, median and variance) for different KPI data types.
Apart from integer and real values, benchmarking of categorical values may also
be of interest.
S1 Anonymity of Users. The identity of the users must remain private. Other
parties (including the platform provider) may neither learn who is participating
in a benchmarking nor whether a particular organisation is participating.
S2 Confidentiality of KPIs. As KPI values may contain sensitive information
about a user’s organisation, they must not be revealed to third parties (including
the platform provider). The platform has to ensure that the benchmarking results
are aggregated in a fashion that prohibits the recovery of individual KPI values.
S3 Confidentiality of Selection Attributes. If other parties learned the selection
attributes of a participant, they could deduce the identity of a participant, either
with context knowledge or by an intersection attack (cf. Sect. 5.2). Therefore, the
values of selection attributes used during peer-group formation must not be
revealed to other parties (including the service provider).
S4 Enforced Peer Group Formation. The platform has to enforce the
peer-group formation as requested by the initiator. Users who do not meet the
requested criteria may not join a benchmarking.
U1 Off-the-Shelf Technologies. The platform should utilise existing technologies
and communications infrastructure, i. e. the Internet, to lower entry barriers for
users and platform providers.
U2 Polling The platform should not require its users to run servers which require
inbound connections. Instead, the client software should use polling to retrieve
new messages in short intervals.
U3 Near-time Availability of Results. Benchmarking results have to be available
within a short time to enable users to set up multiple consecutive benchmarkings
over various KPIs and peer groups to gain information exploratively. Results
should be made available to the other participants as an incentive to participate.
They schould be archived and published on the platform.
U4 Scalability The system is supposed to scale with increasing numbers of
participants and benchmarkings.
or identities. Multiple participants may collude to achieve this goal. We
leave malicious participants, who inject or forge messages, for future work.
Furthermore, we limit ourselves to SPs and CAs who carry out their
duties honestly. While the CA is considered trustworthy the SP may ma-
liciously try to gain information about the benchmarkings. The last group
we consider are outsiders who are not using the platform. They may either
passively or actively try to gain knowledge about running benchmarkings,
the identity of participants or their KPI values. To this end, they may
record network traffic or even maliciously inject messages.
5 Addressing Core Requirements
5.1 Secure Multi-Party Computation of Mean Value
Our benchmarking platform is independent of the SMC protocols. For
evaluation purposes we have implemented two popular SMC protocols
prototypically (results are provided in Sect. 7). Both of them facilitate
the distributed computation of the sum of multiple values. The arithmetic
mean of the values is easily found by dividing the sum by the number of
participants. Of course, more advanced protocols addressing other statis-
tics can be implemented in the future.
SumSecureSplit. The first one is an extension to Atallah’s Secure Split
Protocol (cf. [3] for a detailed explanation of that building block). The
Secure Split protocol allows a group of m participants Pj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
who provide private numeric inputs x(j), to securely share these values
among themselves. As output of the protocol each participant obtains
m blinded values z(j) such that
∑m
j=1 x
(j) =
∑m
j=1 z
(j). In addition to
Atallah’s specification, our scheme requires each participant Pj to send his
value z(j) to all the other participants, enabling each of them to compute
the final result z =
∑m
j=1 z
(j). The presented protocol uses a collusion
threshold k = m− 1 for best privacy protection.
SumHomomorphic. The second protocol employs a homomorphic cryp-
tosystem with an additive property EhPub(
∑m
j=1 x
(j)) =
∏
m
j=1E(x
(j)) [17].
Using a shared homomorphic key pair Kh = (KhPub,KhSec) participants
Pj , 1 < j < m submit their encrypted private numeric inputs EhPub(x
(j))
to a party unaware of KhSec (the SP), which will execute the multiplication
and distribute the still encrypted result to the participants afterwards. Fi-
nally they gain the result
∑m
j=1 x
(j) by decrypting the received result with
KhSec.
5.2 Preserving User’s Anonymity
Users should connect to the server through an anonymisation service (like
Tor or JonDonym)2 to protect their IP addresses. On the platform, they
are addressed with a pseudonym, which cannot be linked to their identity.
Our protocol uses public key certificates as pseudonyms. However, this
scheme is not sufficient: it is conceivable that the set of selection attribute
values may uniquely identify a participant, i. e. when only one organisation
exists in the world which matches those criteria. Our protocol ensures that
neither the service provider nor other clients learn the selection attribute
values.
If other participants can observe that a single client (identified by
a static pseudonym) takes part in consecutive benchmarkings, they can
mount an intersection attack by slightly varying the selection criteria and
observing whether the targeted client takes part in the benchmarking or
not. In order to protect clients from intersection attacks, clients use a new
pseudonym (ephemeral public key certificate) for every benchmarking.
5.3 Enforcing Peer-Group Formation
Given our set of requirements, the SP cannot enforce peer-group formation
on its own, because it must not learn the selection attribute values (cf.
requirement S3). We assume that – as a trusted party – the CA may learn
these values and is able to validate their correctness, though. Therefore,
the client has to present the selection attribute values to the CA in order
to receive an attribute certificate containing them.
In order to participate in a benchmarking a client has to forward the
list of requested selection criteria together with its own attribute certifi-
cate to the CA. The CA checks whether the client’s attributes match the
requirement and creates a participation certificate, which includes the cur-
rent pseudonym of the client and the satisfied selection criteria, on success.
The client has to present the participation certificate as a means of autho-
risation to the SP. In order to maintain unlinkability (cf. Sect. 5.2), the
client must request a fresh participation certificate for each benchmarking
– even if it contains the same statement.
6 Protocol
The protocol proceeds in four phases. Figure 2 outlines the involvement of
the various parties in each phase. We assume that all connections between
2 cf. http://www.torproject.org/ and http://www.jondonym.de/, respectively
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Fig. 2. Involvement of parties in the course of the protocol
clients, SP and CA are encrypted using TLS to protect against attacks
from outsiders. For practical purposes the SP offers a predefined list of
selection attributes Sglobal and KPIs Xglobal for various subject areas to
choose from. The following sections outline the building blocks of the
communication protocol.
Registration at the CA. In phase 1 a user i creates a permanent key pair
K
(i)
perm = (k
(i)
pPub, k
(i)
pSec). Then, he registers at the CA providing k
(i)
pPub, his
real-world identity, and a list of j selection attributes s
(i)
client = (s1, . . . , sj)
with their corresponding attribute values a
(i)
client = (a
(i)
1 , . . . , a
(i)
j ) which
shall be used during peer-group formation. If the verification of the sup-
plied data succeeds the CA will sign the user’s long-lasting public key
k
(i)
pPub for future authentication. The user also receives an attribute cer-
tificate Cert
(i)
attributes = (k
(i)
pPub, s
(i)
client,a
(i)
client), which ties the validated se-
lection attribute values a
(i)
client to his identity represented by k
(i)
pPub. Once
the registration is completed, a user can either initiate a new benchmark-
ing or participate in a pending one.
Creating Ephemeral Key Pairs. In phases 2–3 users are identified by
ephemeral public-key certificates. K
(i)
perm cannot be used for communi-
cation with the SP or other clients in order to maintain unlinkability.
Whenever a user i wants to set up or participate in a benchmarking, he
creates a short-lived (ephemeral) key pair K
(i)
eph = (k
(i)
ePub, k
(i)
eSec), which is
exclusively used for one benchmarking and cannot be linked to K
(i)
perm.
Benchmarking Setup. When a new benchmarking is set up phase 2 is
entered. A user i can issue an ad-hoc request for a new benchmarking b of
a specific KPI x ∈ Xglobal at any time. Therefore, he requests the CA to
sign an ephemeral public key k
(i)
ePub after having authenticated with k
(i)
pPub.
Then, the user sends a benchmarking request BR = (k
(i,b)
ePub, x, t, sreq, creq)
to the SP. The BR includes a vector of selection attributes sreq and the
requested criteria creq. The initiator is willing to wait for participants
until deadline t. The SP validates the signature on k
(i)
ePub and adds the
request to the list of benchmarking announcements on success. All clients
(including the initiator) can now indicate their interest to participate.
When the deadline expires, the announcement will be removed from the
list and the computation starts.
Joining a Benchmarking. If user i wants to participate in a pending bench-
marking b from the list of announcements, he will create a new ephemeral
key pair K
(i)
eph. Then, he presents k
(i)
ePub, Cert
(i)
attributes, s
(b)
req and c
(b)
req to the
CA and requests it to sign k
(i)
ePub and to issue a participation certificate
Cert
(i,b)
p = (k
(i)
ePub, s
(b)
req, c
(b)
req). The CA will only comply, if a
(i)
client matches
the criteria specified by s
(b)
req and c
(b)
req. After that, the client sends a par-
ticipation request PR = (Cert
(i,b)
p , b) to the server. The server validates
PR and checks that s
(b)
req and c
(b)
req contained in Cert
(i,b)
p are identical to
the corresponding fields in BR. On success it will add the signed k
(i)
ePub to
the list of participants. Once the deadline t is reached, the server checks
whether the security requirements are met, i. e. a certain minimum num-
ber of clients are willing to participate. It proceeds by publishing the list of
participants PL(b) = k
(·)
ePub, which contains a list of their signed ephemeral
public keys.
Participating in a Benchmarking. In phase 3 the distributed compu-
tation takes place. All n participants of benchmarking b retrieve PL(b)
from the server and validate the signatures of the contained k
(·)
ePub to
prevent the SP from maliciously injecting participants. On success they
proceed with the actual SMC protocol, which is not shown here in de-
tail for conciseness. Each message m exchanged between two clients is
signed and encrypted using the ephemeral keys before transmission: m′ =
enc
k
(j)
ePub
(m, sig
k
(i)
eSec
(m)). When the SMC protocol terminates, all clients
submit their final result values to the SP, which announces them publicly
(phase 4). The SP may use a majority vote in case the reported values
are not identical.
7 Performance Evaluation
We implemented the platform prototypically in Java SE 5 on Linux. All
messages were encoded in XML and transmitted over TLS-secured sockets.
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Fig. 3. Server-side traffic for SumSecureSplit (left) and SumHomomorphic (right)
Clients applied end-to-end encryption to all messages exchanged between
each other using 1024 bit RSA keys. The JVMs of the CA and the SP
were running on off-the-shelf hardware (2 cores, 2.20 GHz, 3 GB RAM),
the clients were instantiated on a Dual Xeon 2.13 GHz machine with 2 GB
of RAM and connected with 100 MBit/s.
As a comparison with existing SMC-based platforms [11, 8] is difficult
due to differing assumptions, we limited our evaluation to the SMC pro-
tocols we implemented so far, SumHomomorphic and SumSecureSplit, for
varying numbers of users (10, 20, 40, 80). In each run all users registered
in the first 60 seconds. Afterwards 10 benchmarkings with 10 selection cri-
teria each were executed in sequence. Each time users had 60 seconds to
join the benchmarking and to form the peer group. Clients were configured
to use a polling interval of 7 seconds. On average the statistics compu-
tation was finished within 8 seconds (SumHomomorphic) or 17 seconds
(SumSecureSplit), respectively.
According to our results both SMC protocols offer satisfactory perfor-
mance for peer groups of reasonable size. Figure 3 indicates that SumSe-
cureSplit induces more traffic than SumHomomorphic. As illustrated in
Fig. 4 the traffic for the one-time registration is insignificant – in stark
contrast to the peer-group formation. While the proportion of the SMC
protocol increases rapidly with the number of users for SumSecureSplit,
this is not an issue for SumHomomorphic. This finding is not surprising
as SumHomomorphic has been designed with a client-server architecture
in mind and does not rely on extensive peer-to-peer communications [11].
The CPU load of both SMC protocols is noncritical as seen in Fig. 5.
The servers are idle, waiting for requests most of the time. Considering
the distributed computation of the SumSecureSplit protocol the load of
the SMC component is surprisingly high, though. This can be ascribed to
the extensive processing of client-client-messages at the server.
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Fig. 4. Server-side traffic allocation for various protocol phases using SumSecureSplit
(SS) and SumHomomorphic (SH)
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8 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented a centralised privacy-preserving platform for benchmark-
ing of numeric values which is the first one to integrate intuitive, user-
controlled peer-group formation with flexibly exchangeable SMC proto-
cols. Users are free to initiate and participate in benchmarkings, while the
employed SMC protocols ensure that sensitive KPI values are not disclosed
at any time. Furthermore, we have demonstrated how ephemeral key pairs
can be used to foil intersection attacks targeting users’ anonymity. An-
other novel concept in our work concerns the architecture of the platform:
in addition to a central service provider we deploy a dedicated CA, which
ensures appropriate separation of duties. The evaluation of a prototypical
implementation using off-the-shelf technologies yielded promising results.
The calculation of the arithmetic mean of a set of secret KPI values with
the help of two classical SMC protocols performs fast enough for practical
purposes. Following up from here the modular concept of the platform
allows us to easily assess the properties of many more SMC protocols ad-
dressing various other statistics in a common environment. Furthermore,
the platform will allow us to study countermeasures against iterative inter-
section attacks, which exploit our peer-group formation scheme to identify
certain participants with unique selection attribute values.
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